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Worse than Vallandigham
Governor Oliver P. Morton, Lambdin P.
Milligan, and the Military Arrest and Trial
of Indiana State Senator Alexander J.
Douglas During the Civil War
STEPHEN E. TOWNE
My papa was an excellent public speaker. He often talked to me,
in my youth, about the importance of voice cultivation, no mat-
ter what profession one practiced. If you wanted to make your-
self attentively heard, either in public address or private
conversation, you should pitch your voice in the lowest register
at your command. High-keyed shouting would earn you nothing
but the other fellow’s suspicion that you were in doubt or insin-
cere. You should be careful to enunciate your consonants clearly:
the vowels would look after themselves. No matter what he
talked about, when my papa spoke, his audience listened. You
could hear a pin drop.1
On May 7, 1863, Indiana State Senator Alexander J. Douglas gave aspeech at a Democratic rally in Crestline, Ohio. Douglas criticized
the administration of Republican President Abraham Lincoln and its
policies, stating that the army had interfered with Indiana local elections
__________________________
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and had illegally arrested the leading Democratic critic of the Lincoln
administration, Clement L. Vallandigham. Douglas urged fellow
Democrats to fight back if necessary to protect their right to vote. On
May 13, troops acting under orders from U.S. Brig. Gen. John S. Mason
arrested Douglas at the railroad station as he waited to return to Indiana.
The general acted after conferring with Ohio’s governor, who in turn had
received a tip from Crestline residents who had heard the speech. Prior
to making the arrest, military authorities obtained approval from Ohio
Senator John Sherman, at home during a break in Congress. Douglas
was imprisoned in Cincinnati and tried by military commission, the
same tribunal that had convicted former Ohio Congressman
Vallandigham. Lambdin P. Milligan, whose name would feature in a sub-
sequent United States Supreme Court landmark ruling—Ex Parte
Milligan—served as Douglas’s defense counsel. The commission found
Douglas guilty of speaking disloyal sentiments and thereby violating a
military edict—General Orders Number 38—promulgated by the com-
mander of military forces in the District of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. Ambrose
E. Burnside. However, Indiana’s Republican Governor Oliver P. Morton
intervened with President Abraham Lincoln and his administration, and
astonished Burnside with the news that Lincoln and his cabinet disap-
proved of Vallandigham’s arrest and Burnside’s policy of military inter-
vention into civil matters. With this news of the president’s unhappiness
with his actions, Burnside backed down from his aggressive policy and
instructed his commission to find Douglas not guilty of the charge and
released him. Furthermore, the commission disbanded, and no more
military prosecutions under General Orders Number 38 occurred there-
after.
This brief overview, featuring an extraordinary cast of top national
figures, reveals important events that occurred during the federal gov-
ernment’s efforts to suppress a rebellion in the South and incipient
unrest in the Old Northwestern states. However, the event is almost
completely unknown to historians.2 The arrest and trial of
Vallandigham, occurring only days before, overshadowed the arrest and
__________________________
2A biographer of Lambdin P. Milligan made passing reference to the Douglas case, and reprint-
ed Milligan’s speech. See Darwin N. Kelley, Milligan’s Fight Against Lincoln (New York, 1973).
See also Craig D. Tenney, “Major General A. E. Burnside and the First Amendment: A Case
Study of Civil War Freedom of Expression,” Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University,
Bloomington, 1977, 189.
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trial of Douglas, admittedly a political leader of much smaller stature.
Nonetheless, Douglas’s arrest and trial prompted the intervention of
Governor Morton in an effort to avoid insurrection and bloodshed in
Indiana and throughout the North. Morton’s efforts ended a notorious
episode in which military authorities violated the civil liberties of
Northern citizens by curtailing the constitutional rights of free speech
and a free press.
A study of the Douglas arrest and military commission trial is use-
ful in evaluating historians’ understanding of the widespread incidence
of military arrests of Northern civilians during the American Civil War.
Today, analysis of such arrests is dominated by the work of Mark E.
Neely Jr. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Fate of Liberty:
Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1991), Neely corrected long-held
assumptions of generations of historians about where and how arrests
occurred, and who was arrested. In a close examination of large quanti-
ties of Civil War-era records, Neely concluded that, indeed, under the
Lincoln administration numerous arrests occurred in an effort to silence
political opponents. He pointed to the rash of arrests to silence
Democratic opponents in late summer and early fall of 1862 as the “low-
est point for civil liberties in the North during the Civil War…and one of
the lowest for civil liberties of all time in United States history.”
However, Neely lessened Lincoln’s faults by noting that most arrests
occurred in the border states, such as Kentucky and Missouri, where
fierce guerrilla warfare and nebulous allegiance to both the Union and
the Confederacy predominated. Moreover, thousands of arrests occurred
for offenses that did not rise to issues of constitutionally protected civil
liberties. These included selling liquor to soldiers, smuggling goods to
the South, running blockades, and fraud and corruption in making con-
tracts with the federal government to supply and feed the army. Such
arrests were made amid the “friction and abrasion” of war, and very few
rose to the level of a “politically significant” threat to civil liberties. By
highlighting the vast number of incidental arrests in comparison to
those of political significance, Neely tempered his criticism of Lincoln’s
record:
It seems unlikely that any significant number of arrests of politi-
cally important individuals have been overlooked. Such cases
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provoked speeches in legislature, pamphlet protests, and news-
paper copy. They were few in number. Most prisoners of state
came from incidents of war.3
Little known as it is, Alexander J. Douglas’s arrest merits careful
consideration. It was important because it prompted Morton’s interven-
tion and intercession with Lincoln to rein in an army commander whose
heavy-handed methods were creating havoc in the Midwest. The details
of Douglas’s arrest and its significance emerge from an examination of
federal and state archives and manuscripts that most historians who
have studied such arrests have overlooked. This study is the fruit of
piecing together numerous strands found in disparate locations.
In examining the Douglas arrest in detail, we gain an understand-
ing of important dynamics at work during the Civil War. First, the case
shows the important role of a state executive in the creation of national
policy. The arrest and trial created significant friction between military
authorities and civil authority at the state level. Indiana Governor
Morton intervened in the matter, and politically outmaneuvered
General Burnside. Coming amid a larger power struggle between the
governor and the general, the Douglas case added tension to their
already strained working relationship. Second, Douglas’s arrest generat-
ed local protests and rallies in both Ohio and Indiana.4 Examining the
arrest of a political leader of local significance, and the local opposition
to the Lincoln administration it generated, will aid our understanding of
how antiwar protest manifested itself throughout the North, and remind
us not to ignore apparently local and insignificant events. Last, the
episode helps shed light on the rise to prominence of Milligan, whose
skillful legal defense in the military commission trial advanced him in
the public’s eye and encouraged him to play a leading role in both
Democratic party politics and secret organizations to undermine the
Lincoln administration in the North.
__________________________
3Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York, 1991),
53, 124, 132, 133. Neely first developed this thesis in “The Lincoln Administration and
Arbitrary Arrests: A Reconsideration,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, 5 (1983),
6-24.
4Neely argued that military arrests were few and did not greatly affect the Northern population:
“Arbitrary arrests caused few remarkable disorders, no matter how sensational the case or how
famous the victim.” See Neely, “The Lincoln Administration and Arbitrary Arrests,” 11.
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Alexander J. Douglass was born in 1827 in Richland County, Ohio,
near the town of Mansfield, the son of farmers. When Alexander was
twelve, an attack of rheumatism crippled his father, rendering the older
man unable to work. Alexander and his two younger brothers Thomas
and Michael farmed the land to support their parents and two younger
sisters. When not busy farming, Alexander attended a local school in the
winter. Reputed to be a voracious reader as a youth, he began to teach
school locally at eighteen. He soon enrolled at a local academy (or high
school) at nearby Ashland, and then at Wittenberg College in
Springfield, Ohio. It was at this time he dropped the second “s” in his
family name. Douglas intended to study for a career in law, but the col-
lege aimed to produce pastors for Lutheran congregations.
Notwithstanding that he and his family were Presbyterians, Douglas
studied for the Lutheran ministry. However, he failed his examination
for the pastorate and did not graduate, as the examining committee was
not satisfied by his answers to questions on accepted doctrine.5 His fail-
ure to receive full credentials did not hinder him from filling Lutheran
pulpits for many years later in his life, nor from teaching in church
schools up until his death. Shortly after leaving Wittenberg in 1850 he
married Mary Jenner, of a prominent Richland County family.
Douglas’s failure to become a Lutheran pastor allowed him to
revert to his earlier ambition to practice law. After teaching school for
two years in Upper Sandusky, Ohio, he read law in the Mansfield firm of
Samuel J. Kirkwood and Barnabas Burns. After three years of toil and
study, Douglas passed the Ohio bar in 1855. The Douglas family reset-
tled in Whitley County, Indiana, nearly due west of Richland County,
Ohio, by about one-hundred-seventy miles. There the family grew, with
a succession of children added to the couple. After teaching at the
Wartburg Seminary, Douglas established a law practice in Columbia City
and soon began to develop a name as an effective Democratic Party
speaker and advocate. He won election as Whitley County prosecutor in
1858, and played an active role in public affairs in the county and the
surrounding region. Appointment as county school examiner followed.
Later in that year he offered himself for his party’s choice for state repre-
sentative, but came in third place in the candidate selection process. In
__________________________
5Douglas, Time to Remember, 35-38. My thanks to the Wittenberg University alumni records
office for their assistance.
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addition to holding public offices, Douglas continued to teach at a local
Lutheran school.6
In common with a substantial minority of his fellow Democrats at
the outset of war in 1861, Douglas voiced his decided opposition to fed-
eral coercion. Reacting to a pro-war sermon preached in a local Lutheran
church, he announced in a long letter in Columbia City’s Democratic
newspaper that he did not want “blood on my garments.” A speech at a
county party convention in September 1861 again embroiled him in dis-
pute. While denying that he termed a recently recruited volunteer com-
pany a bunch of “yellow legged abolitionists,” he admitted to having
said that there was “disloyalty in places where loyalty was pretended.”
The denominational and oratorical controversies do not appear to have
damaged his standing in the community, at least among the Democratic
majority: Douglas won reappointment as county school examiner, and
the newspaper reported that his private, Lutheran school enjoyed a large
enrollment.7
Democrats in Whitley County selected Douglas to represent them
as a delegate at the important January 8, 1862, state party convention in
Indianapolis. There, state Democrats resolved on a strongly worded anti-
war “Union as it was, and the supremacy of the Constitution” platform.
Though not without disputes among factions within the party, Democrats
denounced the Lincoln administration’s policies to coerce the Southern
states as illegal and unconstitutional, and demanded that the federal gov-
ernment begin peaceful efforts to reunite the country. Emancipation of
slaves and the interference with states’ institutions they denounced. The
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus leading to “arbi-
trary arrests” of civilians and violent suppression of Democratic newspa-
pers critical of Republican party policies they deplored.8
In the coming months newspapers in the northeastern Indiana
region reported Douglas’s speeches in a number of towns. In July,
__________________________
6A Biographical History of Eminent and Self-made Men of the State of Indiana…. 2 vols.
(Cincinnati, Ohio, 1880), vol. 2, District 12, pp. 23-24. Kirkwood subsequently moved to Iowa
and became Governor and United States Senator. See Dan Elbert Clark, Samuel Jordan
Kirkwood, Iowa Biographical Series (Iowa City, 1917). Barnabas Burns during the Civil War
commanded an Ohio volunteer regiment and was a prominent pro-war Democrat.
7Columbia City News, May 21, May 28, June 4, June 11, June 18, June 25, September 10, 1861.
8Kenneth M. Stampp, Indiana Politics during the Civil War (1949; Bloomington, Ind., 1978),
129-33; Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880 (Indianapolis,
1965), 118.
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Democrats from Huntington and Whitley Counties chose him to be
their candidate for state senator in the upcoming election. Douglas cam-
paigned vigorously through the two counties, following many of the
tenets established by the state party at its January convention and win-
ning praise for having “backbone” and being a good speaker.9 In keeping
with the party platform plank of denouncing Northern sectionalism as
the source of civil war, he stated that noted New England abolitionist
Wendell Phillips and his ilk were worse disunionists than Jefferson
Davis, the president of the rebel Southern Confederacy.10 Fellow
Democratic antiwar firebrand Lambdin P. Milligan, a Huntington attor-
ney, often shared the platform where Douglas spoke. Milligan at the time
had sought the Democratic nomination for the U.S. House of
Representatives for the 11th District in the counties around Fort Wayne,
but was rebuffed. Still, he campaigned energetically in the summer and
fall, and in a Whitley County speech blasted the Lincoln administration’s
illegal war, asserted that the administration did not wish to suppress the
rebellion, and claimed the honor of being the first person in Indiana to
denounce “this war as unnecessary, unjust and infamous!”11 In Indiana’s
1862 congressional election, Democratic candidates rode the wave of
their party’s revival, based on public displeasure with the Lincoln admin-
istration’s failures to subdue the rebellion and on indignation at the pre-
liminary Emancipation Proclamation, military arrests of civilians,
suppression of the Democratic press, and other Republican policies.
Democratic candidates in Indiana nearly swept their races, and their
party regained majorities in both chambers of the General Assembly.
Douglas handily defeated his Republican opponent by a majority of 301
votes.
At the opening of the General Assembly in January 1863, Douglas
and his fellow Democrats enjoyed their restored preeminence in the
state legislature, and promised the party faithful that they would, among
other things, clip the wings of Indiana’s domineering Republican gover-
__________________________
9Fort Wayne Weekly Sentinel, August 2, 1862.
10Columbia City News, July 22, July 29, 1862.
11See the Columbia City Republican, n.d., reprinted in the Huntington Indiana Herald, August
6, 1862. Morton’s private secretary, W. R. Holloway, sent a clipping of the Herald article to
United States Attorney for Indiana, John Hanna, and wrote: “Enclosed please find some
extracts from the Huntington Herald. He should be arrested at once. Please give this your per-
sonal and immediate attention.” Holloway to Hanna, August 15, 1862, in John Hanna Papers,
Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington.
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nor. The power struggle in the 1863 session between the majority
Democrats and the minority Republicans led by Morton was undoubted-
ly the most dangerously contentious in the General Assembly’s history.
Douglas, though a new state senator and generally quiet during the vitu-
perative debates, participated in the raucous session. Caucus leaders
appointed him to several committees, most importantly the Senate
Committee on Education, where he employed his teaching experience in
crafting and rewriting legislation to fit Democratic racial ideology.12
__________________________
12Brevier Legislative Reports (South Bend, 1863), 80, 127, 153. Works on the 1863 General
Assembly include Lorna Lutes Sylvester, “Oliver P. Morton and the Indiana Legislature of
1863,” in Robert G. Barrows, ed., Their Infinite Variety: Essays on Indiana Politicians, Indiana
Historical Collections, vol. 53 (Indianapolis, 1981), 123-54; and Justin E. Walsh, The
Centennial History of the Indiana General Assembly, 1816-1987 (Indianapolis, 1987).
Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton. Morton opposed both the
antiwar plans of the state’s Democrat-controlled legislature and the
attempts of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside to control public speech.
Courtesy of the Indiana Historical Society
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Douglas raised his voice to speak in the Senate on other issues per-
taining to race. In February he spoke to amend a resolution from the
Committee on Federal Affairs that the Lincoln administration, in possi-
ble peace talks with the “seceded States,” should not interfere with the
rights of the Southern states to protect slavery. Two days later, in a
debate on the merits or dangers of arming ex-slaves for service in the
Union army, he questioned a Republican senator about the possibility of
Lincoln withdrawing the Emancipation Proclamation: “Suppose he
takes it back, won’t he stand just where he did before he issued it?”13
Douglas saved his eloquence for an impassioned address near the
end of the session during a debate on how the General Assembly should
communicate its views to Indiana’s soldiers in the field. Many Indiana
regiments, irritated by Democratic sentiment in the North, which they
increasingly viewed as disloyal, had sent threatening memorials to the
Democrat-controlled legislature in disapproval of its utterances and
efforts, most notably its attempts to wrest power from Morton. Douglas
rose to defend the majority-written report that was to be sent to the
Indiana troops, depicting Democratic legislators as “true and loyal
men.” He castigated the Republican minority report for encouraging the
army to believe the Democrats were disloyal. “You are afraid the army
will have faith and confidence in the Democratic party, and you are
working might and main against it.” Sending the majority report,
Douglas maintained, would show the troops that the Democrats were
“ready and willing to stand up for that unity of Government—the
Union—the entire Union.” He also accused Republicans of attempting
to monopolize power. Responding to an opposing senator’s statement
that Republicans controlled “more type and presses and papers than
we,” Douglas replied:
Yes, well may he say it; and in a short time they will [have] all of
them, for they are demolishing Democratic presses one after
another until bye and bye we will not have a Democratic press
left us. Saturday night Samuel Medary’s press went down—one
after another they are blotted out by this loyal party.14
__________________________
13Brevier Legislative Reports (1863), 131, 138.
14Ibid., 228-29. Leading Ohio peace Democrat Samuel Medary and his newspaper, The Crisis,
suffered violent attacks and arrest during the Civil War. See Reed W. Smith, Samuel Medary and
The Crisis: Testing the Limits of Press Freedom (Columbus, Ohio, 1995).
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When Republican legislators “bolted” the session and the capitol, leav-
ing the Democrats without a legal quorum to do business, the session
collapsed and ended. Douglas returned home to Columbia City on the
March 10 morning train, “looking well” in the eyes of the town’s
Democratic newspaper editor, and resumed his legal practice. As the
Assembly had not passed a budget bill to fund state government,
Democratic legislators confidently expected to be called back into spe-
cial session by the governor. Democrats would then pass legislation to
wrest military power from the governor and take control of state govern-
ment. But Morton quite illegally opted not to call a special session, and
instead borrowed funds from private banks, Republican-controlled
county governments, and the War Department to pay necessary state
expenses. The frustrated Democratic legislators stayed home. Douglas
attended to business and played an active role in party affairs, participat-
ing in the raucous Democratic meeting at Fort Wayne on April 29.15
In early May, Senator Douglas and two of his daughters traveled to
his hometown of Mansfield, Ohio, to attend the wedding of his younger
brother, Capt. Thomas E. Douglass, and to visit family. The captain,
commanding a company of Richland County recruits in the 15th Ohio
Volunteer Infantry Regiment, had been shot through the lungs at the
battle of Stones River in Tennessee in early January.16 The visit should
have been a pleasant interlude, an opportunity for the Indiana Democrat
to mend fences with his Republican brothers amid the wedding festivi-
ties and the celebration of the captain’s survival. However, the senator
was pulled into the maelstrom of Ohio and national politics. Former
Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, the Midwest’s leading
antiwar political figure, had returned from Washington, D.C., intent on
stirring up the Democratic Party in his state. Voted out of the U.S. House
of Representatives after his congressional district was gerrymandered to
favor a Republican candidate, Vallandigham was intent on securing the
Democratic nomination for governor of Ohio at the state party conven-
tion in June. Speaking at several venues in the state, Vallandigham
worked to mobilize the strong antiwar wing of the party and to gain its
__________________________
15Columbia City News, March 10, 1863; (Fort Wayne) Dawson’s Daily Times and Union, April
30, 1863. Leading antiwar Democrats Milligan and Harrison H. Dodd, among others, spoke at
the Fort Wayne rally.
16Alexis Cope, The Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers and Its Campaigns, War of 1861-5 (Columbus,
Ohio, 1916), 245.
backing for his nomination. At a rally at Columbus on April 30, he
attacked Burnside’s General Orders Number 38. The general’s order,
announced earlier in the month, came as a reaction to rising antiwar
sentiment in the states under his command. Burnside was intent on
stamping it out, and aimed to use military power to do so. The order
stated that “treason expressed or implied will not be tolerated,” and that
expressions of opposition to the government and/or sympathy for the
Southern rebels would be punished by military authority. Burnside had
publicly stated his view that military authority was “invested with a lit-
tle more power [than civil authority] in suppressing anything like trea-
son, and acts that tend to create dissention.”17 Vallandigham ripped into
the order as an illegal and unconstitutional usurpation of authority and
a violation of free speech. The following day Vallandigham spoke to a
large Democratic audience at Mount Vernon, Ohio, and again castigated
Burnside’s military order in rich terms. On this occasion, the general had
sent observers to the meeting who reported back the substance of the
speech. Burnside dispatched a company of troops to Vallandigham’s
hometown of Dayton to arrest the speaker. There, in the dark, early
morning hours of May 5, troops surrounded his house, battered the door
down, and arrested the former congressman. They took Vallandigham to
Burnside’s Cincinnati headquarters and deposited him securely in
Kemper Barracks, a military prison there. Burnside acted promptly to
initiate a military commission trial of the prisoner for violating his gen-
eral orders.18
Dayton dissolved into chaos when daylight came. Alerted to the
news of Vallandigham’s arrest, Democrats from surrounding communi-
ties poured into the city to join their compatriots in riot, torched the
city’s Republican newspaper, and managed to burn part of the down-
town in the process. Troops arrived from Cincinnati and Columbus, bat-
tled the rioters, and put out the fires. Military commanders, with the
assent of Ohio Governor David Tod, imposed martial law on the city,
arrested many rioters, and restored order. Burnside quickly convened a
military commission trial for Vallandigham on the morning of May 6,
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17Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 20, 1863.
18Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War (1970;
New York, 1998), 152-60, 164-66; William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 235-
37. See also Michael Kent Curtis, “Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-war Speech in the Civil
War,”William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 7 (December 1998), 105-191.
and on that day an army captain (one of two officers sent to hear the
speech, both dressed in civilian clothes) testified as to what he saw and
heard of the Democrat’s speech at Mt. Vernon. The trial continued for
another day, and in the evening of May 7 the commission found the for-
mer congressman guilty of publicly expressing sympathy for the rebels
in arms against the United States, in violation of General Orders
Number 38. The Cincinnati newspapers reported on the trial in detail,
and the news spread throughout the country.19
While Republicans and pro-war Democrats rejoiced at the news of
Vallandigham’s arrest, the reports provoked both shock and outrage
among Democrats throughout the Northwest. Ohio Democrats were
stunned. Democrats in Crestline, a railroad junction town five miles
west of Mansfield, were especially shaken. They had expected
Vallandigham to speak there on May 7 as the star attraction at a party
rally. Casting about, organizers invited visiting Indiana State Senator
Douglas to speak in his stead.20
On a “dark, dreary and dismal” Thursday afternoon which threat-
ened rain, two days after Vallandigham’s military arrest and the Dayton
riot suppressed by martial law, Douglas, local speakers, assembled
Democrats, and other onlookers moved the open-air rally indoors and
huddled in a large stable on the edge of the town. Democrats in the audi-
ence “gave three cheers for Val., and three groans for General Burnside.”
According to an eyewitness account of the rally published in the
Republican Bucyrus Weekly Journal newspaper, handbills circulated in
the town stating that Vallandigham had been killed. The crowd, angry,
loud, and boisterous, had been warmed up by two speakers before
Douglas. They had been warmed up as well by the “kindly influences of
free whisky.” The Democrats directed rude epithets and threats at the
Republican onlookers in attendance. Cheers for “Jeff. Davis” and cries of
“d——d abolitionist” emanated from the crowd. “Frequently during the
speeches, when anything was said by the speakers that was, in the esti-
mation of the secesh sympathizers, severe on the Administration, or any
of our Union Generals, a lot of the butternuts would call out—‘That’s
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19Klement, The Limits of Dissent, 166-68. The transcript of the trial appears in The War of the
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington, 1899), series 2, vol. 5, 634ff, hereafter cited as OR.
20Crestline Democrats polled a two-hundred-vote majority in their township elections in early
April. Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, April 9, 1863.
what’s the matter, by G-d.’” When it was his turn to speak, according to
the report, Douglas
said he did not like the name Copperhead. Some one in the
crowd suggested that it was altogether appropriate. He then pro-
nounced a eulogy on Val.; then abused the Administration; then
slandered a certain Judge Harris; and then slandered the protes-
tant churches. He never had, and never would support the war
policy of the Administration. He, the speaker, advised, though a
marshal might be present, the crowd to buy powder and lead and
resist military arrests. He called our Government the greatest
despotism in the world. Resolutions were here offered, for which
see Forum.
The resolutions passed at the rally included a statement repudiating mil-
itary arrests of civilians. Several additional speakers addressed the rally
before it wrapped up late in the afternoon.21
The pro-Union eyewitness to the rally who wrote the account for
the Journal significantly noted the presence of other Unionists at the
rally. “Union men who were present, who did not say aught, were
abused; and were personally pointed out by some of the hearers, and
also some of the speakers, as spies.” The Crestline audience knew from
reading the Cincinnati newspaper reports of the first day of the
Vallandigham trial that the army’s prosecution rested on the testimony of
an army officer in civilian clothes planted in the audience. Democrats
also resented the rise of the Union League movement, a Republican net-
work of secret lodges consciously organized as a counter-balance to the
Democrats’ secret Knights of the Golden Circle lodges throughout the
Midwest. As the war continued, tensions increased between these antag-
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21Bucyrus Weekly Journal, May 15, 1863. The Forum referred to is the Crawford County
Forum, the Democratic newspaper of Bucyrus, copies of which for the dates in question are not
extant. Leading Ohio antiwar Democrat Samuel Medary’s newspaper The Crisis also reported
that Douglas spoke at the Crestline meeting and printed the resolutions passed. It later noted
Douglas’s arrest. See The Crisis of May 20 and May 27, 1863. The Huntington Democrat later
noted that Douglas also spoke at Riblet’s School House in Richland County on May 8. See
Huntington Democrat, August 6, 1863. The Bucyrus Weekly Journal of May 15 also reprinted a
Cleveland newspaper piece noting that a United States marshal was indeed in attendance at the
Crestline rally.
onistic groups, and both sides began to arm themselves in preparation
for violent conflict. Thus, amid the growing tension, the Journal’s eye-
witness wrote: “it would not have been safe for a Union man to have
attempted to report the speeches with pencil and paper.” But “[t]here
were men present at the butternut meeting who did hear, and who are
willing to tell publicly what they heard.”22
The Unionists in Crestline took matters into their own hands.
Evidence suggests they reported the speech to government authorities
and requested government intervention to punish the speaker. News of
Douglas’s speech reached Governor Tod by May 12. W. W. Bagley, the
Crestline agent of the Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Railroad,
telegraphed:
Competent authority to decide upon charges preferred being suf-
ficient to warrant arrest as also to make the arrest should be sent
here and thence to Mansfield today. The evidence is already
[crossed out in original telegram] The man goes to Indiana
tomorrow morning —The evidence is all ready & the charge if
anything worse than those preferred against Vallandigham. This
move breaks in upon an organization to arm as against arrests.
Parties preferring the charges are here waiting.23
Tod, a lifelong Democrat, had been a firm supporter of the federal war
effort from the beginning of the war. In the matter at hand he acted
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22Bucyrus Weekly Journal, May 15, 1863. For a study of the rise of the Union Leagues in the
North during the Civil War, see Frank L. Klement, Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies,
Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War (Baton Rouge. La., 1984), 34-63. Klement dis-
counted the existence of the Knights of the Golden Circle organization, suggesting that it was
merely a Republican “concoction” employed to portray Democrats as traitors. See Klement,
Dark Lanterns, 7-33, and also his The Copperheads in the Middle West (Chicago, 1960);
“Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana during the Civil War,” Indiana Magazine
of History, 61 (March 1965), 31-52; “Ohio and the Knights of the Golden Circle: The Evolution
of a Civil War Myth,” Cincinnati Historical Society Bulletin, 32 (Spring-Summer 1974), 7-27.
Klement’s thesis of the nonexistence of the KGC has been influential among historians, but
some have begun to challenge it. See Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of
Lincoln’s Opponents in the North (New York, 2006).
23Bagley to Tod, May 12, 1863, in State Archives Series 145, Telegram Received, box 50,006B,
box 6, folder 2, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio; a copy of the telegram appears also in
RG 109 M345, roll 76, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., here-
after cited as NARA.
promptly to punish opposition speech. That day he consulted with the
commander of U.S. Army forces at Columbus, Brig. Gen. John S. Mason.
Mason agreed to send a junior officer, Lt. J. B. Irwin, immediately to
Crestline and Mansfield to investigate the circumstances. Mason’s orders
specified that:
If upon learning from [Bagley] a full statement of the case, you
are fully satisfied that it is sufficiently aggravated to warrant an
arrest, and if the party is of sufficient importance, you will pro-
ceed to Mansfield Ohio, where you will consult with Mr. John
Sherman, and if in his opinion the best interests of the service
will be advanced, by so doing, you will take the necessary affi-
davits and arrest the party, or parties, and bring them to this
city.24
Mr. John Sherman was in fact Republican U.S. Senator John Sherman,
resident of Mansfield, at home during Congress’s spring recess. The sen-
ator, an important leader in Washington, had spoken a few days earlier
at the Union rally in Fort Wayne, Indiana, which had provoked a riot in
that strongly Democratic city. On May 7, the day of the nearby Crestline
Democratic rally and Douglas’s speech, Sherman wrote from Mansfield
to his brother, Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, then in
Mississippi fighting to capture the rebel stronghold of Vicksburg.
Senator Sherman’s assessment of the mood in Ohio immediately after
Vallandigham’s arrest was favorable but cautious:
Here nothing occurs worth noting. If there is any change it is for
the better. The tone of popular opinion is more patriotic[.] There
are fewer noisy Butternuts, and most of those think their bad talk
is only from opposition to the Administration. The only danger is
that this will become downright opposition and resistance to the
war be the inevitable result. A good many scary people are afraid
of this but I am too much accustomed to political quarrels to
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24Unsigned letter, probably written by Mason’s assistant adjutant general, Capt. John Green, to
Lt. Irwin, May 12, 1863, RG 393 Part IV, Post of Columbus, Ohio Records, E 270, Letters Sent,
NARA; a copy also is found in RG 109 M345, roll 76, NARA.
look for danger from them. There may be occasional riots as
there was one the other day in Fort Wayne, when I made a
speech but both parties pledged themselves in the war and only
differed about the nigger and administration measures. The dif-
ference may widen and unless we have military success will
widen until we have open and hostile “war” and “Peace” par-
ties.25
Sherman no doubt had heard reports of the Crestline speeches, and
so when the army lieutenant called on him he approved the arrest.
Having found Douglas to be sufficiently important, Lieutenant Irwin
and troops under his command made the arrest at the railroad station at
Crestline the following morning, May 13, where the Indiana Democrat
was awaiting a homeward train with his two young daughters, Alice and
Elizabeth. The troops carried Douglas away, leaving the two girls alone
at the train station. The troops took their prisoner to Columbus, where
Douglas was held in the City Barracks. That day Mason sent Douglas
under guard to Cincinnati, and wrote to his immediate superior, Brig.
Gen. Jacob D. Cox at Cincinnati, commander of the military district of
Ohio, with copies of the paperwork generated in the matter. Mason
wrote, “The party was sent at the suggestion of the Governor. At his
request also I will send an officer with a party of twelve or fifteen men to
IND IANA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY16
__________________________
25John Sherman to William T. Sherman, May 7, 1863, in William Tecumseh Sherman Papers,
microfilm roll 7, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A daughter of Gen. Sherman published
edited texts of the two brothers’ letters in 1894, a time when Senator Sherman was still alive (he
died in 1900). The editing was so extensive as to create severe distortions of meaning. A com-
parison of the edited version of John Sherman’s long letter of May 7 to the original letter reveals
striking omissions in the published version. Editor Rachel Sherman Thorndyke excised the
senator’s scathing references to President Lincoln that revealed his lack of confidence in the
occupant of the White House. He wrote originally: “How fervently I wish Lincoln was out of
the way. Anybody would do better. I was among the first of his political friends to acknowledge
how fearfully we were mistaken in him. He has not a single quality helping his plea…. He is as
unstable as water—afraid of a child…. [H]e is unfit to control events and it is fearful to think
what may come during his time. What he will do now it is impossible to say. He is subject to the
deepest depression of spirits amounting to Monomania. He looked upon Hooker as his last
card…. [T]he war is prolonged, and but little chance of its ending until we have a new deal (a
new President)…. I certainly would be glad to support a War Democrat—any body rather than
our monkey President. If the latter is renominated which I do not anticipate then I certainly
will raise the banner of opposition. The Nation could not endure his reelection.” Ibid. None of
these comments appears in the published version. See Rachel Sherman Thorndyke, The
Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891
(New York, 1894), 203-205.
Crestline this afternoon as he has an intimation of trouble there which
he thinks can be prevented by a small force.”26
The arrest of Douglas at Crestline created a furor among the town’s
Democrats. Ohio newspapers reported that Democrats “threatened to
tear up the railroad,” “burn the town,” and “mob the Union men,” but
the squad of seventeen troops sent from Columbus on Governor Tod’s
suggestion quelled the disturbance. The newspapers reported that
Douglas had “advised resistance to the conscription,” and was arrested
for violating General Orders Number 38.27
General Cox promptly turned Douglas over to his superior, Major
General Burnside, commander of the Department of the Ohio.
Burnside’s officers imprisoned Douglas in Kemper Barracks, on
Columbia Street in Cincinnati, described by one of Burnside’s staff offi-
cers as “our Libby Prison.” It housed many of the prisoners arrested by
Burnside’s orders, including Vallandigham and several Dayton rioters,
along with deserters and spies. One of several military prisons in the city,
Kemper held “over two hundred rebel, civil, and political prisoners…of
all classes, conditions and sexes.”28 Most of the prisoners hailed from
Kentucky. According to one of Burnside’s staff officers, General Orders
Number 38 had had the effect of filling the military prisons. Two com-
panies of troops surrounded and guarded the prison, a miserable hole
from which prisoners desperately wanted release. During the first week
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26Gen. Mason to Gen. Cox, May 13, 1863, RG 393 Part IV, E 270, NARA; also found in RG 109
M345, roll 76, NARA. After his release Douglas described his arrest in several speeches. A
newspaper reported Douglas’s speech at the July 18 Democratic meeting at Warren in
Huntington County: “He had been on a visit to Ohio with his two little daughters; had received
after a week’s sojourn, a telegram announcing the sudden illness of his wife, and prepared to
come home. He was seized at the railroad station by a military squad, dragged away from his
two children, who were left among strangers with no one to take care of them, and hurried
away to a military prison.” Douglas also said he was “cheered in his confinement by the Spartan
like firmness of his wife, whose soothing letters inspired him. She advised him not to take the
oath of allegiance; and to remain steadfast to Democratic principles.” Huntington Democrat,
July 23, 1863. The troops also arrested a deserter in Mansfield during the expedition. Bucyrus
Weekly Journal, May 15, 1863.
27Cincinnati Daily Commercial, May 14, 1863; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 14, 1863;
(Columbus) Daily Ohio State Journal, May 14, 1863.
28Journal of Daniel Read Larned, entry of May 14, 1863, Daniel Read Larned Papers, Library of
Congress, hereafter Larned Papers; Arnold Shankman, ed., “Vallandigham’s Arrest and the
1863 Dayton Riot—Two Letters,” Ohio History, 79 (Spring 1970), 122. The Cincinnati Daily
Enquirer of May 15, 1863, stated one hundred and eighteen political prisoners were held in
Kemper Barracks at the time.
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Major General Ambrose Burnside, c. 1861. His General Orders Number 38 attempted to
punish civilian speech opposing Lincoln and the war.
Courtesy of the Library of Congress
of Douglas’s imprisonment, guards foiled an escape attempt by thirty
inmates when the wife of one of the men alerted officers.29
Widespread accolades and congratulations showered on Burnside
from Republican newspapers after Vallandigham’s and Douglas’s arrests.
The Cincinnati Daily Commercial, a major Republican newspaper, edi-
torialized:
Words can be made as mischievous as bullets, and are certain to
develop themselves in acts. Where, as in Dayton, Crestline,
Lancaster, and other points there are repeated outbreaks in oppo-
sition to the authority of the Government, and a seditious spirit
manifests itself, we may be sure that the freedom of speech and
the press has been perverted to mischievous objects, and unre-
strained, will lead to deplorable consequences. No truly loyal
man, however, feels that Order no. 38 is a burden upon him.30
Buoyed by this reception, Burnside and his staff prepared to put Douglas
up for trial before the same military commission that heard
Vallandigham’s case and other alleged violations of General Orders
Number 38. Within a week of the Indiana Democrat’s arrest, military
authorities in Cincinnati and Columbus prepared affidavits and gathered
the witnesses to the Crestline speech.31 Capt. James Madison Cutts Jr.,
the judge advocate who tried Vallandigham, left Cincinnati for
Washington, D.C., to attend his father’s funeral and so was not available
to lead the prosecution. In his stead, Burnside appointed Capt. Robert
Hale Ives Goddard, a trusted staff officer, to serve as judge advocate in
the Douglas trial. A member of a prominent Rhode Island family and
Brown University graduate, Goddard worked to prepare the army’s case,
ordering prosecution witnesses from Crestline to report at departmental
headquarters at Cincinnati on May 26. The following day he requested
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29Cincinnati Daily Commercial, May 8, 1863; testimony of Capt. James M. Cutts, Jr., Exhibit
“N,” court martial case file of Capt. James M. Cutts, Jr., MM-0873, RG 153, NARA; Cincinnati
Daily Gazette, May 19, 1863.
30Cincinnati Daily Commercial, May 15, 1863; Larned journal entry of May 14, 1863, Larned
Papers.
31Capt. John Green to Lt. [?], May 19, 1863, and Gen. Mason to Maj. Bascom, May 20, 1863,
RG 393 Part IV, E270, NARA.
defense witnesses to come to Cincinnati for the trial. The Douglas trial
was scheduled to commence on May 29.32
Several days after the arrest, the Indianapolis Daily Journal report-
ed the events of May 13 at Crestline briefly and in passing. The news of
Douglas’s arrest appears not to have reached his hometown promptly.
The Huntington Democrat, a weekly newspaper, first reported the story
in its May 21 edition. It noted that the charges against him were not
known, but presumed that Douglas “spoke his mind rather freely in rela-
tion to the designs of the men in power.” The Huntington Indiana
Herald, a Republican weekly, shortly thereafter reported that Huntington
resident and leading county Democrat Milligan was then in Cincinnati
serving as Douglas’s defense counsel. In Milligan, Douglas had secured
an experienced trial attorney to defend him. However, no evidence
exists to suggest that Milligan had participated in any courts martial or
military commissions prior to his employment by Douglas.33
Another important Indiana figure became involved in the Douglas
arrest case. At the time of the arrest, Governor Morton had been
embroiled in a series of disputes with General Burnside and Burnside’s
subordinate Indiana commander, Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall. Burnside
had appointed Hascall to be commander of the military district of
Indiana on April 22 without consulting with the governor. Three days
later, Hascall promulgated (with Burnside’s blessing) his own order ban-
ning opposition political speech in Indiana to be enforced by military
power—General Orders Number 9. The order, modeled on Burnside’s,
was Hascall’s effort to stifle Democratic criticism of the Lincoln adminis-
tration and the army’s performance, and was tailored specifically for
Indiana. Burnside and Hascall aimed to use the military power at their
disposal to silence criticism and opposition to the government. Both
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32Capt. R. H. Goddard to Gen. Mason, May 26, 1863, and Gen. Burnside to Gen. Mason, May
27, 1863, RG 393 Part IV, Camp Chase, Ohio Records, E 202, Telegrams Received, NARA.
33Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 18, 1863. Confusion in the Ohio newspapers as to Douglas’s
identity may have been the reason for the news reaching Indiana slowly. Some newspaper
reports identified him as a Crestline resident; other newspapers claimed he was the editor of
the Columbia City News. This may explain why there was neither a groundswell of indignation
nor threats of violence in Whitley County and Columbia City immediately after his arrest. The
first major Ohio newspaper to identify Douglas as an Indiana state senator was the Cincinnati
Daily Gazette of May 26, 1863, with a telegraph dispatch from Indianapolis dated May 25. The
Gazette was the regular conduit for leaks from Morton’s office. The Columbia City News first
reported the event in its May 26 edition, citing the Crawford County (Ohio) Forum.
military orders enraged the Republican Morton, who saw that such
heavy-handed and shortsighted military measures would undercut his
authority in the state, and would reverse the gains he had made that
spring in harnessing Democrats both in and out of the General
Assembly. Equipped with intelligence that Democrats were arming and
preparing to resist government authority in several locales in Indiana,
Morton was concerned that blunderbuss tactics employed by military
leaders would foment uprisings. In late April, the governor succeeded in
persuading the generals not to launch a military expedition to Brown
County after a soldier and a Democratic state legislator were shot dead at
a political rally and hundreds of armed Democrats assembled to resist
government authority.34 However, in early May, Hascall arrested several
Indiana Democratic newspaper editors who had dared to criticize or
mock General Orders Number 9, and threatened other Democratic edi-
tors with the same fate. A short period followed when opposition speech
in Indiana was muted from fear of arrest, but soon leading Democratic
political figures rallied across the state to condemn the military edicts.
Morton informed Hascall that he viewed both General Orders 9 and 38
as illegal and counterproductive, and that he considered the arrest and
trial of Vallandigham by military commission as illegal. Hascall wrote
Burnside to report on his alarming conversation with the governor, and
warned his superior to beware of Morton. Taking the matter in hand, the
governor traveled to Washington, D.C., several times in the month of
May in an effort to depose both Hascall and Burnside. There he lobbied
President Lincoln and cabinet members, most importantly Secretary of
War Edwin M. Stanton, to dismiss both of the generals.35
Lincoln had appointed Burnside to the command at Cincinnati as
recently as March, the general having been relieved from command of
the Army of the Potomac after the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg in
December 1862. The president hoped that the general, too prominent to
leave unemployed, would be out of the way yet able to build up and lead
a large force to invade eastern Tennessee. Though warned repeatedly by
Morton and other governors in the winter and early spring of 1863 of
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34G. R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana, Indiana
Historical Collections, vol. 48 (Indianapolis, 1973), 80-83.
35See Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and
the Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863,” Civil War History, 52 (March
2006), 41-65.
the dangerous condition of political affairs in their states, Lincoln did
not pay close attention or heed the governors’ advice. When conflict
between the governors and Burnside arose over the military’s heavy-
handed tactics and intrusion into civil matters, and when chaos threat-
ened to break out throughout the Old Northwest, the president was
unprepared. The political embarrassment of yet again removing
Burnside—popular among many Republicans who relished the general’s
get-tough edict—was too risky. In a private meeting on May 19, the pres-
ident’s cabinet members unanimously regretted Burnside’s arrest of
Vallandigham. While the arrest had been popular among Republicans,
Democrats could now rally around the martyred former congressman
and hold him up as a victim of unconstitutional measures by the Lincoln
administration.36 Democrats throughout the North did just that, and
Vallandigham became a national hero for Lincoln’s opponents in every
Northern state.
During his whirlwind visits to the national capitol in May, Morton
learned that the President and his cabinet were displeased with
Burnside’s actions. While he failed to have Burnside sacked, Morton
returned to Indianapolis with a promise that Hascall would be removed
from his Indiana command. Significantly, during this period in May nei-
ther Lincoln nor his cabinet communicated their displeasure about the
Vallandigham arrest to Burnside. Indeed, Stanton telegraphed the gener-
al shortly after the arrest, stating “In your determination to support the
authority of the Government and suppress treason in your department,
you may count on the firm support of the President.” Burnside inter-
preted this message as hearty support for his policy of arrests for politi-
cal speech.37
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36“The case of Vallandigham, recently arrested by General Burnside, tried by court martial, con-
victed of something and sentenced to Fort Warren was before the Cabinet. It was an error on
the part of Burnside. All regretted the arrest, but having been made every one wished he had
been sent over the lines to the Rebels with whom he sympathizes. Until the subject is legiti-
mately before us, and there is a necessity to act there is no disposition to meddle with the case.”
Entry of May 19, 1863, in Howard K. Beale and Alan W. Brownsword, eds., Diary of Gideon
Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (New York, 1960), 1: 306.
Burnside’s biographer errs in suggesting that Lincoln and the cabinet opposed General Orders
Number 38 rather than the arrest of Vallandigham. See Marvel, Burnside, 238.
37Edwin M. Stanton to Gen. Burnside, May 8, 1863, OR, series 1, vol. 23, pt. 2, 316; Burnside
telegraphed Lincoln on May 8 thanking him for his message of support after Vallandigham’s
arrest. See Burnside to Lincoln, May 8, 1863, box 1, Letterbook number 2, p. 23, Ambrose E.
Burnside Collection, Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence, hereafter cited as Burnside
Burnside learned of the president’s unhappiness with the
Vallandigham arrest and with his policy regarding opposition speech
from two sources. In the evening of May 28, William R. Holloway,
Morton’s private secretary (and brother-in-law) took the night train to
Cincinnati. The following morning, the day that Senator Douglas’s trial
was to commence, Holloway obtained a meeting with General Burnside
at his headquarters, where the secretary conveyed a letter from Governor
Morton:
Having received information that Mr. A. J. Douglass a Senator of
this State is now in confinement in your Department for uttering
treasonable sentiments, I have directed my private secretary Mr.
Holloway to visit you concerning the arrest. Will you please
inform him of the facts and give him any information that may be
proper.38
Holloway informed Burnside that the president and his cabinet did not
support the general’s actions in the Vallandigham arrest or his general
policy of arrests under General Orders Number 38.
On that same morning, after Holloway’s departure from headquar-
ters, similar information came from a separate but equally reliable
source. Captain Cutts, who had served on the general’s staff for some
time, returned to Cincinnati from attending his father’s funeral in
Washington. Cutts, a pro-war Democrat, was the brother of Adele Cutts
Douglas (widow of the late U.S. Senator Stephen A. Douglas), a Harvard
College graduate, and an accomplished attorney. He had successfully
tried Vallandigham weeks before, but had subsequently concluded that
more military commission trials of opposition leaders under General
Orders Number 38 would rebound against the army and the Lincoln
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Collection. Morton traveled to Washington on May 19 to confer with federal leaders, and prob-
ably learned of the sentiments of the cabinet meeting of that date. It is instructive to note that
on May 20, while Morton was in Washington, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Halleck—probably at the governor’s prompting—wrote to Burnside of the dangers of injudi-
cious district commanders and warned him to avoid conflicts with civil authorities, meaning
the governors. See Halleck to Burnside, May 20, 1863, box 7, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, RG
94, NARA.
38Morton to Burnside, May 28, 1863, box 8, Burnside Papers, RG 94, NARA.
administration. Cutts learned in Washington that Lincoln and the cabi-
net considered the Vallandigham arrest regrettable. According to a letter
that he wrote to the president a few weeks later, upon his arrival in
Cincinnati his “first act was to advise Genl Burnside not to try Mr.
Douglas, State Senator from Indiana—telling him the country would not
permit it—that there could be no more such trials as that of Mr.
Vallandigham—and that the Administration were opposed to it.”
According to Cutts, Burnside replied:
I have just informed Governor Morton’s Private Secretary, sent
here to see me about this very man to return and tell Governor
Morton that I would try him if he violated order 38, and I said
the same to Governor Tod himself. I want them to understand
that they are Governors of single States, while I am Governor
over five. Capt try every man who violates the order.39
Nonetheless, the news of the administration’s opposition, con-
veyed by two reliable sources, rattled the general. He quickly
telegraphed President Lincoln:
A messenger from Govr. Morton came to me this morning in ref-
erence to the arrest, by the military authorities of a citizen of
Indiana. I understood from him that my action in the administra-
tion of affairs in this Department was not approved by a single
member of your Cabinet.
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39Cutts to Lincoln, July 26, 1863, Abraham Lincoln Papers (formerly the Robert Todd Lincoln
Papers), Library of Congress. Cutts wrote to Lincoln in an effort to obtain clemency after his
court martial trial resulting from a quarrel among Burnside’s staff officers. Cutts had also dis-
graced himself in Burnside’s eyes by being caught spying on a woman while she undressed at a
Cincinnati hotel. Burnside stripped him of the judge advocate appointment. The court martial
sentenced Cutts to be dismissed from the army, but Lincoln reduced the sentence to a repri-
mand. Cutts later distinguished himself in battle. See Bing G. Spitler, Hero of the Republic: The
Biography of Triple Medal of Honor Winner J. Madison Cutts, Jr. (Shippensburg, Pa., 2001). In
his court martial trial, Cutts tried to enter evidence that the issue of military arrests under
General Orders Number 38 was a central contention. Cutts called Burnside to the stand to tes-
tify, and asked him: “[W]ere you not also influenced by the fact that Capt Cutts differed with
you on an important public question and you found it necessary to have some one who did
agree with you more fully?” Burnside replied: “There were no such considerations as that
entered into this appointment at all.” See Cutts court martial case file, p. 73.
The general, angry as well as shaken, wrote that this news and the previ-
ous telegram of support which Stanton had sent “convinces me that my
action here has been a source of embarrassment to you.” However, the
general voiced his continued faith in a stringent approach to suppressing
dissent, writing, “My views as to the proper policy to be pursued in this
Department are only changed in the belief that the present policy should
be increased in rigor.” Burnside offered to resign his command if the
president wished.40 Lincoln replied promptly in a terse message: “When
I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the cabinet regret-
ted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps,
doubting, that there was a real necessity for it—but, being done, all were
for seeing you through with it.”41
That same morning, during this telegraphic exchange, the military
commission trial of Indiana State Senator Douglas had commenced.
Before a tribunal of army officers, Judge Advocate Goddard charged
Douglas with violating General Orders Number 38 by expressing sym-
pathy for the rebels and “declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions
with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government
in its efforts to suppress an unlawful Rebellion.” Goddard listed the
specifications of the charge. He accused Douglas of uttering the follow-
ing sentiments at the Crestline rally:
• “I thank God that I have not, by word or act, assisted to sup-
port the Administration in carrying on this unjust and unnec-
essary war”
• “That the war was not carried on to restore the Government,
as it was, but for abolition purposes”
• “I advise you to arm yourselves and resist Military arrests; the
sooner we resist such Military despotism the better; We have a
right to resist Abe Lincoln’s dirty Provost Marshals”
• “Our once glorious Government is aiming to build up a des-
potism, and is gaining Military power as fast as possible for
that purpose”
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41Lincoln to Burnside, May 29, 1863, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N. J., 1953), 6: 237.
• “The present Administration is endeavoring to bring the peo-
ple under Military law, so as to deprive them of the right of suf-
frage”
• “When next you go to the Ballot Box, carry your cartridge box
with you”42
Milligan, on behalf of Douglas, initially declined to plead to the charge
and specifications. As Vallandigham had done in his own trial, Milligan
moved that the commission be discharged because it lacked jurisdiction
to try the matter. Douglas, he argued, was neither in the military nor the
naval service, and the court lacked the power to try matters dealing with
free speech. The commission, as it did in the Vallandigham case, swept
aside this jurisdictional argument. Milligan then entered a “not guilty”
plea.43
Captain Goddard called before the court a series of prosecution
witnesses to the speech Douglas gave at Crestline. All of them were
among the pro-Union, Republican onlookers at the rally. One by one,
the witnesses testified that they stood close to the speaker and heard
clearly what Douglas said in his speech. Edwin Booth, a Crestline physi-
cian, testified that Douglas stated the war was “an abolition war” and
was “unjust and unnecessary.” Douglas said that the recent local city
elections at Indianapolis “had been controlled by military authority,”
and that Democrats should march, armed, “in solid phalanx” to the bal-
lot box to resist military despotism.44 The speaker said military arrests
like Vallandigham’s were arbitrary and “ought to be resisted.” “If that is
treason,” he testified Douglas to have stated, “here is 160 pounds of it.”
George W. Pierce, a storekeeper in Crestline, also testified that the
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42All quotes from Alexander J. Douglas military commission case file verbatim transcript, LL-
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43See Exhibit “A,” Douglas trial transcript.
44Douglas may have seen reports in the previous day’s newspapers that Indianapolis Democrats
had withdrawn from city elections in protest. See Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 6, 1863. Voter
intimidation featured in many elections throughout American history, but was especially prob-
lematic during the Civil War. Northern Democrats feared army intimidation like that at polls in
the border states of Kentucky and Missouri would occur in their communities. See Richard
Franklin Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York, 2004),
217-81; and Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, Rude Republic: Americans and Their
Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N. J., 2004), 174-76.
speaker had stated that the Indianapolis election had been rigged by mil-
itary authorities, disallowing Democratic votes. Douglas had advised
Democrats to carry cartridge boxes to the polls. He also testified that
Douglas said “illegal, arbitrary arrests” should be resisted, “but if a child
came to him with proper authority, he could lead him away.” George
Cochran, a Crestline sawyer, testified that Douglas “thanked God that
there were no widows and orphans who could blame him for this war,”
and stated military authorities at Indianapolis had challenged
Democratic voters at the polls, and warned Ohio Democrats to go to the
ballot boxes in the fall gubernatorial election with their cartridge boxes
and resist military authorities if they were so challenged. Douglas had
spoken of military arrests like Vallandigham’s as illegal and unconstitu-
tional, and had said they ought to be resisted. William Kerr, a local
farmer, (whom the Bucyrus Weekly Journal had mentioned was threat-
ened by the crowd at the rally) testified that Douglas stated the war was
to abolish slavery, and not to restore the government; if the country was
to be saved, the Democratic Party would have to do it. Douglas had said
that “Lincoln’s mean, dirty, low-lived Provost Marshals” had no right to
arrest any citizen, but “if a legal officer should send a summons after
him, a boy of ten years old could take him.”45
Milligan cross-examined each prosecution witness and carefully
tested each man’s recollection of the speech. Small weaknesses in the tes-
timony quickly emerged, most notably on the important issue of
whether Douglas spoke of resisting military arrests or “illegal arrests.”
Booth admitted that he could not recollect “the very words used by the
prisoner.” When questioned by Milligan as to whether Douglas actually
used the term “illegal arrests” rather than “military arrests,” the witness
equivocated and replied that the speaker used both. Milligan succeeded
in getting Pierce to admit that he did not recall that Douglas stated the
government was trying to establish a despotic rule and deprive the peo-
ple of the right to vote. Some of the witnesses stood firm in their testi-
mony. Cochran could not be budged, and reiterated that Douglas
“advised them to resist military arrests. ‘I advise you to resist all military
authorities, for they are illegal.’” Likewise, Kerr refused to agree to
Milligan’s suggestion that since he could not recall if Douglas or another
speaker alluded to the government establishing a despotism, that other
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utterances he had attributed to Douglas might actually have come from
other speakers. Milligan also attempted to indict the activities of the
Crestline Union League, the secret, paramilitary Republican organiza-
tion, and suggested that the Republican witnesses may have attended the
Democratic event to spy on their opponents and report the tenor of the
speeches to military authorities, a charge prominent in the minds of
Democrats at the time and reminiscent of the Vallandigham case. In
regard to the issue of military arrests of civilians, he asked Booth: “Are
you in the habit of attending Democratic meetings and do you under-
stand their position on this question?” This question prompted an
objection from the judge advocate and was overruled by the tribunal.
Booth denied being sent to report on the speeches at the rally.46
Milligan called three witnesses to testify in defense of the prisoner
and pressed home the distinction between criticism of military arrests
and illegal arrests. All three witnesses were Democrats who had attended
the Crestline rally and stood close to the speaker during his speech. Led
by defense counsel, they all flatly contradicted the testimony of the
army’s witnesses. C. Fulton, a Bucyrus physician, was the first defense
witness called, and he gave his testimony at the end of the first day of the
trial. He noted that Douglas “said nothing about resisting military
authority, but said he would resist arbitrary or illegal arrests.” He testi-
fied that Douglas advised Democrats to go to the polls peaceably and
“insist upon casting their votes,” but if “prevented by bayonets”
Democrats should take their cartridge boxes and return to the polls and
“demand their right to vote.” Douglas had said, in reference to the recent
Indianapolis election, that an army major had told him that ballots
should be examined, and those not marked for Union candidates should
be thrown out. Fulton denied that Douglas spoke of the government
establishing a despotism, but had said “there was more effort made to
crush free speech than to crush the rebellion; and that the war was
waged more for freeing the niggers and crushing free speech than put-
ting down the rebellion.” This, testified Fulton, was being done by
Republican politicians, not by the government. Cross-examination by
Captain Goddard failed to blur the fine distinction made between the
Republican Lincoln administration and “Republican politicians.”47
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The commission reconvened the next morning at ten o’clock, and
Milligan called his second witness. Samuel Hoyt, a telegraph operator at
Crestline, denied all the army’s charges regarding the subjects and tone
of Douglas’s speech. Hoyt denied that the speaker advised resisting mili-
tary arrests, said provost marshals had no right to make arrests, or
claimed that the government was attempting to create a despotism.
Rather, the witness testified, at Milligan’s subtle prompting, that Douglas
blamed “advisers of the Administration” for trying to establish military
rule and limit free expression of the people, and that “it would end in a
military despotism.” According to Hoyt, nothing in the speech was dis-
respectful of the government and the army. Asked about Douglas’s refer-
ence to cartridge boxes, Hoyt testified that Douglas advised all to vote
peaceably, but if soldiers deterred voters, to “get their cartridge boxes
and go to the polls and vote if it was possible.” Goddard’s cross-exami-
nation failed to move the witness.48
The third and last defense witness was William Becker, a local
farmer. Becker denied that Douglas spoke disrespectfully of the govern-
ment, talked about government despotism, or claimed that he would not
be arrested by Lincoln’s provost marshals. Asked about cartridge boxes,
the witness recalled Douglas stating that in the coming fall Ohio election
voters should try to vote peaceably. “He said ‘if we are driven away by
bayonets, then we would be justified in depositing our votes, even if we
had to take cartridge boxes [’]; he hoped it would not come to that.”
According to Becker, Douglas stated that he would submit to arrest by an
eight-year-old child, provided the child had proper legal papers to sup-
port it. Goddard’s cross-examination focused on Becker’s admission that
he was “hard of hearing,” and may not have heard all that Douglas said.
Becker replied: “I turned the good ear towards him and it might be pos-
sible that some things were said which I did not hear, but he spoke slow
and loud and I paid attention.”49
Neither the defense nor prosecution called further witnesses.
Milligan then made a defense speech, a handwritten version of which
was submitted to the tribunal.50 A skilled and experienced attorney, with
many criminal defense cases under his belt, Milligan was nonetheless
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faced with a novel challenge. Stirring courtroom oratory and emotional
appeals to a jury, often useful in civil jury trials, had no place in military
commission trials. Milligan had to construct a defense argument based
on the facts as established by the testimony of witnesses and present it to
a tribunal predisposed against his defendant.
Milligan first argued, citing the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, that
in “actions for words” the “truth of the words” can be admitted as evi-
dence. He also submitted that the existence of rumor, or the widespread
belief or sentiment of a community, can be admitted. He then suggested
the fact, known by all in the room, that two political parties existed,
“one friendly to the Administration and the other distrustful.” When, he
argued, all citizens adhere to the motto “‘eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty,’” then the distrustful part of the community will naturally keep a
“zealous watchfulness” over those in power. He argued that “any
restraint of that habit is calculated to chafe and irritate the people.”
Restrictions on free speech which the “friends of the Administration”
may find easy and reasonable “might be cause of greatest alarm” among
the distrustful group.
Milligan conceded “for the sake of this argument” that the utter-
ances charged to Douglas were directed at the Lincoln administration
and the army, and not Republican politicians seeking to control them.
However, he argued, the malice of the statements—the essential point in
the army’s charge—was doubtful:
The opinions of honest men are not always matters of choice but
are convictions forced upon them by evidenciary [sic] circum-
stances…to conceal those opinions is a restraint upon the free-
dom of thought to which the American people are not yet
habituated…and in this spirit was the remark of the defendant
made. “That the Administration were doing more to suppress
free speech than the rebellion[”] or those words [“] the present
Administration is endeavoring to bring the people under military
law so as to deprive them of the right of suffrage.[”]
Douglas, argued Milligan, believed exactly that, and “was unable to rec-
oncile” the administration’s actions with an “intention…to restore the
Government, or put down the rebellion.” Republicans had only weak-
ened the North and strengthened the South by their actions and speech-
es about treasonable designs of the Democrats, Northern Democrats’
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sympathy with the rebellion, and Republicans’ “irritating clamour”
about slavery. Thus, the defendant “justly” concluded that the adminis-
tration was not endeavoring to restore the Union and suppress the rebel-
lion; Douglas accordingly “thanked God that the widows and orphans
could not look to him and say he was the cause of the war.”
Milligan next turned to the evidence of the witnesses and pro-
nounced it “by no means satisfactory.” Every point raised by the army’s
witnesses was countered by the defense witnesses’ testimony, he argued,
and the tribunal should be cautious to credit it. The testimony of Booth,
the “principal witness” for the army’s case, was tainted by “feelings and
bias” which made it unreliable. The circumstances of the Crestline rally
were next recalled. “Mr. Vallandigham was the advertised Speaker,” and
the “news of his arrest was fresh and exciting and it could not be expect-
ed that the people would readily acquiesce in a proceeding so rare and to
them full of seeming danger.” In such a context, that Douglas should
utter sentiments extemporaneously which to the commission “might
seem out of place is not to be wondered at.” Milligan argued that nothing
Douglas said could be considered to express sympathy for the rebellion,
to be disloyal, to be an attempt to discourage enlistments, or to be an
incitement to resist the law. Regarding the specification that he uttered
the words, “Our once glorious Government is aiming to build up a des-
potism,” Milligan concluded with as much bombast as the venue allowed:
I know Mr. Douglas could not have uttered such a sentiment.
Because he recognizes no government as ours whose powers are
not founded on the Constitution of the United States the princi-
ples of which are rendered more sacred and glorious by the perils
to which its votaries are daily exposed.
The commission withdrew to deliberate. How long those delibera-
tions lasted and their nature is not recorded in the trial transcript. The
commission returned and found Douglas guilty of two of the specifica-
tions:
• “I thank God that I have not, by word, or act, assisted to support
the administration”
• “When next you go to the ballot-box carry your cartridge box
with you”
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The commission found him not guilty of uttering the following:
• “in carrying on this unjust and unnecessary war”
• “That the war was not carried on to restore the Government as it
was, but for Abolition purposes”
• “I advise you to arm yourselves and resist military arrests [italics
original], the sooner we resist such military despotism the better;
we have a right to resist Abe Lincoln’s dirty Provost Marshals”
• “Our once glorious Government is aiming to build up a despot-
ism, and is gaining military power as fast as possible to bring the
people under military law, so as to deprive them of the right of
suffrage”51
Milligan had succeeded in drawing the distinction between criti-
cism of military arrests—Burnside’s favored means to quell resistance—
and speech decrying mere “illegal arrests.” But Douglas had been found
guilty of uttering words considered an incitement to violent resistance to
authority. The commission judged Douglas to have spoken inflammato-
ry language—his call to carry arms to the polls—in clear violation of
General Orders Number 38. Douglas’s violent language, according to the
judges, had been stronger than Vallandigham’s, which had criticized
Burnside’s order and had merely encouraged voters to expel the tyrant
“King Lincoln.”52 Although the officers on the commission found
Douglas guilty of a serious violation of Burnside’s order, they returned a
verdict of “not guilty” to the overall charge and dismissed the case. With
the weight of Lincoln’s displeasure pressing on Burnside, it is likely that
the general instructed the tribunal to reach the “not guilty” verdict.
Even more surprising than its verdict, with the end of the Douglas
trial the military commission adjourned sine die, never to reconvene.
The tribunal empanelled to try cases of violations of General Orders
Number 38, which had famously convicted Vallandigham, was no more.
Though Cincinnati’s military prisons contained scores of prisoners
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arrested under the order and awaiting trial, the commission was fin-
ished. Lincoln’s disapproval, prompted by Morton’s intervention, had
forced Burnside to dismantle part of his apparatus to control disloyalty.
The general reviewed the findings of the commission and ordered
Douglas to be released from Kemper Barracks prison. Douglas went free
on June 3. The Cincinnati newspapers reported the finding of the com-
mission and the prisoner’s release.53
On June 5 Douglas returned to Columbia City on the afternoon
train and was met at the depot by a crowd of one thousand well-wishers
and a town band. After a triumphant procession to the county court-
house “amidst the firing of cannons and the shoutings of freemen,”
Douglas described his arrest, imprisonment, and trial in dramatic terms,
highlighting the cruelty of his military captors. He tore into the
Republicans and blamed Union League treachery for his arrest. The
assembly passed resolutions condemning the arrests of Douglas and
Engelbert Zimmerman, the editor of the Democratic Columbia City
News, whom General Hascall had arrested and whose newspaper he
suppressed for a short period in May. The Democratic women present
passed resolutions in praise of the two local martyrs for free speech. In
the days and weeks to come, Douglas spoke at Democratic rallies in
Whitley, Huntington, and Noble Counties, describing his arrest, impris-
onment, and trial, and excoriating the Lincoln administration. The par-
tisan crowds received and recognized him as a hero.54
Douglas’s run-ins with military authority did not end there. His
new status as a Democratic party hero and leader meant that he was rec-
ognized by Republicans as one of the “Copperhead ringleaders” in the
region. In early July, newspapers reported that a “mob” in Whitley
County had rescued deserters who had been arrested by the county
provost marshal. The provost thereupon arrested several persons and
sent them to Indianapolis to appear in federal court. Douglas, while not
one of the “mob,” was blamed for it. Several days later Capt. Hiram
Iddings, provost marshal for the 10th Congressional District, rode into
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Columbia City at the head of two hundred troops—a detachment of the
Invalids Corps and four Indiana Legion militia companies—intent on
arresting deserters and more members of the “mob” who had aided
them. After arresting several deserters, the troops assembled in the town
before leaving for Kendallville and raised cheers for President Lincoln
and Generals Meade and Grant. A man in the crowd of onlookers cried
out “Three cheers for Vallandigham!” and ran. Several people in the
crowd took up the cheer. Soldiers angrily gave chase in the direction of
the original voice. In the ensuing melee, Douglas, standing in the crowd,
panicked and “also broke and ran” in the same direction. Confusing
Douglas for the man who yelled for Vallandigham, the soldiers seized
him and forced him into one of their wagons. Douglas’s brother-in-law
Eli W. Brown (Democratic county surveyor at the time) of Columbia
City tried to interpose, but one of the soldiers shot at him four times,
fortunately merely grazing him. The troops also seized Brown and hoist-
ed him into the wagon. Both were threatened with death should they
resist. The soldiers soon released both men when it became clear that
Douglas had not cheered for Vallandigham. The troops arrested the
cheerer and hauled him away to Kendallville.55
A study of the events surrounding Alexander J. Douglas’s arrest,
trial, and release reveals several important issues. First, the episode
highlights the impact the arrest of a political figure of merely local stand-
ing had on national policy. Historians who focus only on the arrests of
national political figures like Clement Vallandigham during the Civil
War overlook events of great significance. Democrats reacted to the
news of the arrest of their local political leaders—their neighbors, peo-
ple they knew or had met—not just to the news of national figures
whom they knew only in the abstract. Douglas was a significant political
figure in his corner of Indiana, and became temporarily so in a place
where he merely visited. Ohio military officers deemed him “of suffi-
cient importance” to arrest him for violating a ban on anti-administra-
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tion speech. The Democrats of the Ohio town where he visited and gave
a speech threatened serious violence as a result of his arrest. A show of
military force was deemed necessary to quell unrest there. On his return
to his Indiana home, Democrats turned out en masse to welcome him,
show solidarity with their party, and demonstrate defiance of Republican
and military authority. Douglas’s arrest and subsequent release energized
the Democrats in his corner of Indiana exactly as Morton had dreaded,
an event replicated in almost every locale where similar military heavy-
handedness occurred. More importantly, the repercussions of the arrest
of this relatively minor political figure took place on the state and
national levels. Burnside’s arrest of Douglas, coupled with military
arrests of newspaper editors, prompted Indiana’s governor to intervene
with the president and his cabinet. This entire sequence of events sug-
gests that historians should burrow more deeply in the archives to
understand better the ramifications of purportedly insignificant and
merely incidental arrests.
Knowledge of the Douglas arrest and trial also overturns our
understanding of the end of Burnside’s intervention into political affairs
in the District of the Ohio to override civil government. Governor
Morton’s lobbying in Washington had forced a president—who had not
paid sufficient attention to political affairs in the Midwest or to the
actions of his military commander there—to rein in Burnside. Though
the general wanted to impose even more rigorous measures to silence
criticism of the administration, he had no choice but to disband the mil-
itary tribunal. In an attempt to retain as much of his get-tough policy as
possible, Burnside held onto General Orders Number 38, but he no
longer enforced it with arrests such as those of Vallandigham or Douglas,
and no more military commission trials for violations of the order
occurred. It is notable that when Burnside ordered the suppression of
the Chicago Times on June 1, shutting down the region’s most important
anti-administration Democratic newspaper, he arrested neither its edi-
tor, Wilbur F. Storey, nor any of its staff.56
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Second, it is critically important to reassess the dynamics between
the Northern state governments and the federal government during the
Civil War. The understanding of the relationship between the Northern
governors and President Lincoln has been dominated by William
Hesseltine’s characterization of the state governors as weak, ineffectual,
and dangerous to the Union’s survival. In his effort to promote Lincoln
as the nation’s preserver, Hesseltine denigrated the governors. Morton,
though perhaps the most effective of the Northern governors during the
rebellion, received special derision at the historian’s hands. Hesseltine’s
thesis has had widespread and lasting influence on generations of histo-
rians, who have seldom examined the complex interrelationships
between state and federal governments.57 The Douglas arrest episode,
along with Morton’s simultaneous effort to stop Hascall’s policy of sti-
fling Democratic newspaper speech in Indiana, should prompt a
reassessment. Through this episode we see a president—preoccupied
with the war effort in the East and the failures of the Army of the
Potomac—passively inattentive to the deterioration of political condi-
tions in the Midwestern states. Assigning Burnside to the Department of
the Ohio shows that Lincoln neither understood the conditions on the
ground nor had a plan to quell resistance in the region. Lincoln, carried
along by the tide of events, failed to oversee his general in a region where
disaffection and resistance to the federal government were becoming
increasingly dangerous. Morton played a leading role in national
affairs—his pressure on Lincoln and the cabinet ended military trials of
civilians under General Orders Number 38, one of the most egregious
instances of military interference in domestic political affairs in United
States history.58
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Morton’s influence in Washington can be gauged by Burnside’s
increasing hostility to him. The general blamed the governor for halting
his policy of rigorous military intervention in political matters. Since
Burnside had taken command of the Department of the Ohio in March,
Morton had fought him in multiple disputes over personnel issues,
troop levels in Indiana, and military expeditions to quell disturbances in
the state. The governor, according to the general, meddled with strictly
military matters. While Burnside had succeeded in keeping the governor
from dictating to him on military administration, the governor won the
upper hand when the general tried to impose military solutions on polit-
ical problems. Morton’s success in removing Hascall and ending military
commission trials so angered one of Burnside’s staff officers that he
turned the governor’s portrait hanging in army headquarters upside
down. Burnside continued to believe that civil authorities possessed nei-
ther the power nor the will to put down resistance to the draft enroll-
ments in Indiana. “The civil law is too slow,” he complained privately.
Neighboring governors acceded to Burnside’s requests to declare martial
law in their states, but Morton resisted military authority and prevailed.
Burnside’s claim to be “Governor over five” states failed to take the
Indiana governor into account.59
Finally, Milligan’s defense of Douglas before the military commis-
sion was perhaps the high point of his political career, and proved to be
his most powerful effort against the Lincoln administration. Democratic
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newspapers published and praised his closing speech, and his successful
defense of the party’s principles burnished his reputation among antiwar
Democrats in northern Indiana. Where he once was an also-ran politi-
cian, he now was a popular party hero and sought-after speaker. The
Huntington attorney took an increasingly visible role in anti-war
Democratic politics in his home county and all over northern Indiana.
However, shortly after his military commission success, Milligan turned
from legal means and embraced extra-legal violence as a method for
political change. Emboldened by his new popularity, later in 1863 he
joined the secret society known as the Organization of American
Knights, previously known as the Knights of the Golden Circle. The
organization changed its name in early 1864 to the Sons of Liberty.
Thousands of members all over Indiana and neighboring states organ-
ized to protect deserters and to oppose the draft by force. The group
secretly perfected plans to raise rebellion in the region, seize federal
arsenals, release and arm rebel prisoners of war, and seize power as a
diversionary measure to aid the Confederate cause. Milligan became the
Sons of Liberty’s military leader for the northeastern quarter of Indiana.
He viewed his popularity and influence sufficient to make a bid for gov-
ernor based on the strength of the antiwar wing of the Democratic Party,
but the party rejected his nomination at the state convention. That sum-
mer the Sons of Liberty planned an uprising in Indiana. Tipped off to the
plans, troops raided fellow leader Harrison H. Dodd’s Indianapolis print-
ing warehouse and discovered boxes full of guns and ammunition, as
well as organizational records. In early October, a company of troops
surrounded Milligan’s Huntington house and arrested him for his role as
a leader of the secret plot to seize arms and free rebel prisoners. He stood
trial by military commission in Indianapolis for treason. It is a signifi-
cant irony that Governor Morton, who a year before was an adamant
opponent of the use of military commissions for trials of civilians, was
now a leading force behind their use to batter his Democratic opponents
in the election year of 1864. The military commission found Milligan
guilty and sentenced him to death, but his sentence was commuted to
life in prison, and in 1866, President Andrew Johnson pardoned him.
While Milligan was imprisoned, a suit made its way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which ruled in 1866 that military trials of civilians shall not
occur where martial law is not in place and the civil courts are open.
Ex parte Milligan is today generally viewed as a landmark ruling defin-
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ing the roles and limitations of military government and constitutional
protections of the citizen.60
Alexander Douglas’s political career wound down after he served
out the remainder of his term in the state Senate. He practiced law in
Columbia City and continued to serve as a school examiner for Whitley
County. He gradually retreated from public affairs and increasingly
turned to filling Lutheran church pulpits in Indiana, Ohio, and
Kentucky. By the time his son, well-known pastor and best-selling nov-
elist Lloyd C. Douglas (born in 1877), was old enough to be cognizant of
his “papa,” the elder man was living a quiet, bucolic existence as a coun-
try parson. If the writer was ever aware of his father’s arrest and impris-
onment for treasonous speech during the Civil War, his gentle and
loving portrait of his father failed to disclose it. He wrote of his father,
“How dearly did this kindhearted old man love peace!”61
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